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Embodiment and Subjectivity in Ludwig Landgrebe's Interpretation of Husserl

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At first glance, it seems that in his published works, Husserl addresses the appearing of phenomena out of a counterintuitive conviction that may be called a subjectivist conviction: namely, that appearing depends on an “act” of consciousness. Why is this counterintuitive? It is because what appears to us always seems to be already given—otherwise, it simply would not appear. It appears because it is and is given. In his “genetic” phenomenology, Husserl himself admits to the pregivenness of what appears. Even there, however, the following question remains for him: how are such phenomena constituted for thematic consciousness in the lived experience of their being and givenness, and how are being and givenness accomplished in concrete terms?¹

In his research manuscripts, Husserl dedicated more investigations to these questions than anyone before him in the history of philosophy. Thus all the legitimate attempts by Husserl’s critical successors to de-subjectivize appearing as such, to think further into the event of appearing as something pre-subjective or even a-subjective, seem to be anticipated by Husserl himself from his own phenomenological point of view where the appearing of phenomena itself always remains a lived experience (*Erleben*, in his terms). However, the levels of such lived experience should be differentiated. The appearing is an event that happens in subjectivity as a field, and this event should therefore be traced back through its different levels down to its ultimate foundation in the living present, to use the terminology of the later Husserl. In that general sense—a sense yet to be specified—the appearing itself remains framed and shaped by subjective

¹ One of the first summaries of Husserl’s “genetic” approach was published by Ludwig Landgrebe in 1933. He mentions the idea of pregivenness when he writes that a being was already this or that before we became acquainted with it in our experience of it. And this aspect of being already there also belongs to the sense through which the entity is given to us. On the other hand, this sense also had to be constituted, even if these constitutions are a matter not of actual active synthesis but of “the most deeply sedimented formations of connections … of associative references”—Ludwig Landgrebe, “Die Methode der Phänomenologie Edmund Husserls,” *Neue Jahrbücher für Wissenschaft und Jugendlbildung* 9 (1933), 386f., 391.

functioning, even if the subjectivity of the transcendental life implied in this functioning is a pre-egoic subjectivity.

How is it possible, even today, to appreciate how subtly Husserl was able to uncover the complexity of experience by approaching the question “how is it possible that things appear?” from his own particular perspective—a perspective that sees subjectivity as where the appearing is experienced (*erlebt*) and where its phenomena are given: a “where” that might even be originally instituted by the very life event of appearing as the primal locus (*Urstätte*) of all phenomena?²

One way to approach this question (a way that Ludwig Landgrebe, like other Husserlian phenomenologists of his generation, followed) is to focus not only on the inner time-constitution of phenomena (or even, on the Heideggerian path, on ek-static temporality), but also on the bodily circumstances of lived experience. The questions that Landgrebe raises in this context allow us to approach the problem of how the “where” of the experiential appearing of the phenomena is connected with the bodily circumstances (if any) of this appearing. This is certainly one of the convictions that Landgrebe repeatedly expresses in his papers from the 1960s and 1970s.

Now in other philosophical approaches, a question regarding the subjectivity of appearing might be seen as irrelevant—indeed, for some, any question at all concerning subjectivity is irrelevant. But insofar as phenomenology consists in an investigation of experience that at the very least presupposes the first-person perspective as its point of departure and as the theme of its research, the question of the subjective and bodily character of the appearing retains its relevance, even if this is neither its only point of departure nor the sole or main theme of its research. From this perspective, the aim of this paper is to show that in Landgrebe’s interpretation of Husserl, the subjective character of appearing and the bodily dimension of appearing are closely linked, and that in their mutual irreducibility, they are inseparable from the lived experience of appearing.

Self-awareness through Inner Time-Consciousness

What do we mean by the subjectivity of appearing in Husserl? In the static phenomenological perspective that characterizes the beginning of Husserl’s work, one elementary sense of the subjectivity of appearing as lived experience is already established, that of the pre-reflective self-awareness of every experience.

² “This primal locus is my living streaming present, the streaming life in which everything holding good for me and existing for me arises as a thing, a process, another human being, I myself as one human being among others—even, universally, as the world I live in, in such a way that all of this will now be taken purely as my subjective phenomenon, just as it arises, and as nothing other than a moment of this life itself” —Edmund Husserl, *Späte Texte über Zeitkonstitution (1929–1934). Die C-Manuskripte*, ed. Dieter Lohmar, *Husserliana Materialien VIII* (Dordrecht: Springer, 2006), 41 (subsequently cited as Hua Mat VIII).

Experiences exist and are accessible to me as my experiences; no matter how diverse and strange they might be in their content, they are still lived by me, otherwise they could not be experiences at all. In this elementary sense they remain mine even if they are mine only in a non-thematic, implicit, or “tacit” way.³

Experiences are subjective in the sense of being mine, but not in the sense that their content would be private, because even the classical static model of appearing—where everything that appears is mediated, “given” through apperceptions (apperceptive and appresenting meanings that let objects of consciousness appear *as* something)—already implies that the appearing intentional object is an intersubjective one in various ways. Yet all of these elements of the classical concept of appearing as the synthetic activity relating given, non-intentional contents to intentional objects through apprehensions and appresentations nevertheless remain subjective, at least in their manner of givenness: they are all *my* lived experiences, or in other words, they remain subjective as an event or immanent process of lived experiencing; they are all primordially mine. To put it another way, the appearing of phenomena through all these apperceptive forms of objectivation (which do indeed turn out to be intersubjectively mediated in many ways) presupposes the irreducible, primordial, subjective element of lived experience. But Husserl did not stop there. Instead, he inquired further back into the genesis of the event of lived experience as a subjective event. Since all active performance has a passive substratum, a certain “hyletic” pregivenness might be correlated with an “anonymously” functioning I. In the very middle of these processes—which are at work in both the “anonymous” or “non-actional” functioning that occurs without the active participation of the I and the “actional” performances where

³ Dan Zahavi uses the term “tacit self-awareness” to refer to this feature of every lived experience; see his summary of this first elementary condition of the subjectivity of appearing as lived experience: “Husserl took first-personal givenness to be something that essentially characterizes experiential life. It is something the experiences cannot lack without ceasing to be experiences. At its most primitive, self-consciousness is simply a question of having first-personal access to one’s own consciousness; it is a question of the first-personal givenness or manifestation of experiential life”—Dan Zahavi, *Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First-Person Perspective* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2005), 51.

the I is indeed engaged—Husserl discovers the kinaesthesiae and perhaps the feelings.⁴

Before we follow Ludwig Landgrebe in tracing this move of Husserlian reflection into the realm where the self-sensitivity or self-affectivity of every lived experience is explored in terms of the kinaesthetic and hence bodily character of lived experience, let us recall what kind of self-awareness Husserl had already discovered in the context of his analysis of inner time-consciousness, an analysis that does not initially take bodily self-presence into consideration.

On the one hand, as Husserl admits from the start, lived experience already has, as such, its own internal or immediate “tacit” self-relatedness; on the other hand, it has not only this formal character (similar to the analytic unity of self-consciousness already found in Kant), but a “material” character of sensing (*Empfinden*), a characteristic brought out in the context of the analysis of inner time-consciousness.⁵ As Dan Zahavi has argued, it is already the case that at one level of this analysis, “inner time-consciousness … is the pre-reflective self-awareness of the stream of consciousness.”⁶ Thus even without any explicit reference to embodiment, the stream of lived experience, regarded in its own right, must include an immediate, non-manifest, pre-phenomenal, and pre-reflective self-manifestation that is already temporally structured.

But within the framework of genetic phenomenology, this “pre-reflective self-awareness” as a “self-affection”—including its immediate, implicit, non-objectifying, and passive nature—refers to other levels or contexts of the analysis rather than to the level of inner time-consciousness:

For the temporalization of nature in primordiality, or respectively, in my immanent sphere, we once again, and already earlier, come upon a core: namely, my living body is distinguished in the primordial nature, and

⁴ “In any case, all constitution of transcendence within immanence rests upon particular modes of ‘engagement,’ of involuntary engagement (reactions, reflexes) and active engagement of the I. Now the I as such is indeed an awake I, and the substratum of a field of what already exists [is] a field for the I, only existing for it by virtue of specific egoic sources; this must be clarified through systematic unbuilding, including clarifying that the functioning I is anonymous in its functions and that what exists for it originally exists by virtue of an actionality that for its part is interwoven with non-actional kinaesthesiae and perhaps feelings. Egoic activity presupposes passivity—egoic passivity—and both presuppose association and pre-consciousness in the form of the ultimate hyletic substratum”—Hua Mat VIII, 53.

⁵ See the interpretation of the first paragraphs of the *Fifth Logical Investigation* and of other early texts by Husserl in his debate with Brentano in Dan Zahavi, “The Three Concepts of Consciousness in *Logische Untersuchungen*,” *Husserl Studies* 18 (2002), 51–64.

⁶ Dan Zahavi, *Subjectivity and Selfhood*, 51.

the perception of the living body [is likewise distinguished] for the primordial core-perception, for nature-perception.⁷

The lived body that plays an important role in the passive self-constitution of empirical, personal subjectivity is already presupposed when it comes to the constitution of primordial nature. What impact does this functioning of the lived body, of the flesh, have on the event of appearing? When we can say with the later Husserl that the subject of the event of appearing is a bodily subject, how must the subjectivity of the event of appearing be reconsidered?

The I and the Body in Landgrebe's Interpretation of Husserl

Let us begin with the intuitive evidence that in all our experience we inevitably encounter our own embodiment, and that a functioning subjectivity will therefore always already have to be an embodied subjectivity, at least to some extent. It seems Husserl also had such intuitive evidence in mind in the following:

Experience of the body as a spatial body, an experience containing its variety of appearings and kinesthesias, refers back—as all such experience does—again to the body as a functioning body, so the perception of what is bodily and of the entire body itself already presupposes the body—that is, psychophysical experience.⁸

Here it may not only be of historical interest to ask how Husserl maintains the relevance of subjectivity in contexts in which he unequivocally and deliberately abandons the Cartesianism of his classical writings, showing instead that the lived body is an essential dimension or even a core of subjectivity.

One of the most significant interpretations summarizing work in this field up to the late 1960s was a 1974 article on the problem of passive constitution in

⁷ I quote the translation by Lanei Rodemayer of the following passage: “Für die Zeitigung der Natur in der Primordialität bzw. in meiner immanenteren Sphäre stoßen wir noch einmal und schon früher auf einen Kern, nämlich in der primordialen Natur ist mein Leib ausgezeichnet und für die primordiale Kernwahrnehmung, für Naturwahrnehmung, die Leibwahrnehmung” (Hua Mat VIII, 111)—Lanei Rodemayer, “Levels of Constitution: Analyses in Husserl’s Later Phenomenology” (paper presented at the International Research Summer School in Genetic Phenomenology 2018, “Edmund Husserl’s C-Manuscripts: An Open Project,” Warsaw, Poland, September 27, 2018).

⁸ “Die raumkörperliche Erfahrung vom Leib, mit ihren Mannigfaltigkeiten von Erscheinungsverläufen und Kinästhesien, ist wie alle solche Erfahrung wieder zurückbezogen auf den Leib als fungierenden, so dass die Wahrnehmung vom Leiblichen und vom ganzen Leib schon den Leib, also psychophysische Erfahrung voraussetzt”— Edmund Husserl, *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Texte aus dem Nachlass. Dritter Teil: 1929–1935*, ed. Iso Kern, *Husserliana XV* (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973), 326, as quoted in Didier Franck, *Flesh and Body: On the Phenomenology of Husserl*, trans. Joseph Rivers and Scott Davidson (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2014), 81.

which Ludwig Landgrebe formulated three theses, the second of which is the most essential for our purposes.⁹ In this study, he discusses what precedes the subjectivity of appearing in the sense of an “active constitution and synthesis” carried out by the “acts of the I,” acts that take up a particular standpoint by means of an apperceptive meaning-bestowing. The original passivity in passive constitution must not only be distinguished from those active syntheses, but is presupposed in each active constitution carried out through the acts of the I. This passivity is thus in some sense prior to the conscious I.

According to Landgrebe, the character of this dimension of lived experience is mysterious in that it is “passive”—that is, on the one hand, it takes place “without the activity of the I” (75/53).¹⁰ It is not a subjective act in the sense of the act of an active I but is a presupposition for such an act that has, on the other hand, the character of an event that is an event of the alive I, or of the life of the I: “This entire primally streaming event is not a dead event; rather, egoic ‘performance’ is [its] innermost motor” (75/54).¹¹

However, Landgrebe’s first thesis lends itself to the following interpretation: this ultimate subjective foundation, the source of appearing, does not appear to itself originally. That which is phenomenized out of it when it becomes, after the fact, a theme of reflection is not the original streaming of the lived experience itself, but a certain objectivation of it.

With his second thesis, Landgrebe then offers a more precise summary that provides support for the intuitive view with which we began—namely, that

⁹ The three theses are as follows: “1) The ‘depth-dimensions’ of the process of constitution cannot be attained by phenomenological reflection. 2) The functions of corporeality belong to the functions of passive pre-constitution and thereby to ‘transcendental subjectivity.’ 3) The primal streaming event of ‘transcendental subjectivity’ is to be understood as a creative process”—Ludwig Landgrebe, “Das Problem der passiven Konstitution,” [1974] in *Faktizität und Individuation* (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1982), 71–87, here 73; “The Problem of Passive Constitution,” trans. Donn Welton, in Ludwig Landgrebe, *The Phenomenology of Husserl: Six Essays*, ed. Donn Welton (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1981), 50–65, here 51–52. In the remainder of the present essay, all parenthetical page numbers refer to this work; although in many cases the quotations have been newly translated and thus depart from the published English translation, page references to the latter will be provided for the convenience of the reader, following the page number for the German text and separated from it by a slash. Note that in the quotation just cited, the term “creative” is intended in contrast with apperception, i.e., the “apprehending and determining of something *as* something” (71/50).

¹⁰ Citations to this piece will appear as parenthetical references. The phrase from Ms. C 17 that Landgrebe is quoting here can now be found in Edmund Husserl, *Zur phänomenologische Reduktion. Texte aus dem Nachlass (1926–1935)*, ed. Sebastian Luft, *Husserliana XXXIV* (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002), 179 (subsequently cited as Hua XXXIV).

¹¹ The sentence quoted from Ms. C 10 can now be found in Hua Mat VIII, 199; Landgrebe himself took the quotation from Klaus Held, *Lebendige Gegenwart* (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966), 103, where Held comments that “dead” should be understood as “non-living” in the sense of something “foreign to the I.”

the body for Husserl is not only a constituted unity of meaning that appears as an object (the body that I *have*), but also a constitutive or even constituting power thanks to which appearing takes place. The question we are interested in would be whether my body itself does necessarily appear only in its tacit interconnection with anonymously functioning lived experience, or whether it is also given in yet another, non-phenomenal way. To what extent does the lived body take part in subjective appearing as such—that is, to what extent is embodiment itself anonymous—and how does my own embodiment nevertheless separate itself from this anonymity so that in this separation, it may become a polarizing factor marking the moment of transition from an anonymous process (one that does not appear to itself) to a subjective event of appearing? These are questions that arise in connection with Landgrebe's second thesis according to which “*the functions of embodiment themselves belong to the functions of passive pre-constitution and thereby to ‘transcendental subjectivity’*” (78/56).

Now there is indeed a connection between such functions of embodiment on the one hand and the anonymous streaming of the pre-phenomenal foundation of appearing on the other, a connection rooted in the passive synthesis that provides the material for the active determination of the hyletic contents constituted in inner time-consciousness. It is genetic phenomenology that notes this connection between the emergence of concrete impressions based on affection and the role of kinaesthesia in this event. Landgrebe gives the following examples: in the case of the perception of sounds, the hyletic datum of a tone (a tone constituted as enduring thanks to the fact that its fading away is sustained by retentions) only becomes an impression, something given, thanks to a listening that is not just an “inner act of attention,” but “already presupposes previous kinaestheses such as turning the head to hear” (81/59), or in the case of visual data, the movement of the eyes. When we connect the analysis of the temporal constitution of hyletic data in inner time-consciousness with the analysis of the kinaesthetic syntheses, we find, according to Landgrebe, that “*without impressions, there are no time-constituting achievements and without kinaestheses there are no impressions*” (81/59). Thus according to these considerations, impressions emerge “in a kinaesthetic process without which there would be no living streaming present, which cannot be thought of otherwise than as a primal-impressional present” (81/60).

Moreover, if each affection leading to an impression is “originally an affection of sense organs as organs of my body,” and if “kinaesthetic movements are the conditions of possibility for the affections of the sense organs,” then Landgrebe considers it necessary to acknowledge embodiment “*not only as constituted, but as constituting*” (82/60).

But the lived body that functions as a condition for any affection itself remains non-manifest, non-phenomenal, in at least one of its functions. This seems to follow from Landgrebe's thesis that “anything whatsoever that can become a datum for me is already determined through the organization of the

sensory fields related to the body” (82/60). In this function, then, the lived body itself does not enter into the perceptual field.

The temporal self-constitution of the stream of experience, which is itself anonymous in its original passivity, nevertheless proceeds in connection with such bodily functions as kinaesthetic activity and passivity. Our own lived body does also appear in the perceptual field, even in the primordial field: it not only appears as an intersubjectively constituted object (*Körper*), but already appears as *Leib*.¹² Yet in order to appear, the body must be lived: it must be lived as mine, it must be *my* lived body. In this sense, the experience of one’s own body, associated with the anonymous stream of lived experiences beneath the “pure I,” must also be a subjective power that transcends this very anonymity insofar as it is a particular self-relation intrinsic to embodied subjectivity itself. It thereby seems that this implicit experiencing of the self—here, for example, as a possibility of movement—should entail at the outset a subjective polarization of the stream of experiences, a stream that would otherwise remain anonymous. It even seems that this bodily “I can” could be the origin of the centering of the stream of experiences into the I.¹³ Indeed, the one is not possible without the other: without an experience of the possibilities available to the body, without a bodily experience of the “I can,” there can be no activity of self-relating experience, no activity of a conscious I.

On the other hand, Landgrebe considers the genetic link between the body and the I as follows: “the body only gradually appropriates itself as available” (82/61). Thus movement does in fact precede consciousness of the possibility of having bodily movement at one’s disposal. Nonetheless, according to Landgrebe, the body in this facticity of involuntarily movements is not yet constituted as *my* body. “The body,” he writes, “is only *my* body thanks to the fact that I apprehend its organs as the totality of what is immediately available to me” (82/61). From the standpoint of the genesis of the body as my own, as an organ that I have freely at my disposal, one must presuppose a kinaesthesia that is not free, an involuntary kinaesthesia, as the genetic foundation for the possibility of experiencing the “I can” that characterizes the manner in which I have my own body, even if actually having our own body at our disposal occurs “before we have this consciousness of it” (82/61).

In this connection, Landgrebe (83/61) refers to *Ideas II* in order to formulate a conclusion that is important for our question: “The ‘I move,’ the ‘I

¹² See Edmund Husserl, *Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge*, ed. Stefan Strasser, *Husserliana I* (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1950), §44.

¹³ James Mensch, *Postfoundational Phenomenology* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001), 43.

do,’ originally precedes the ‘I can do.’”¹⁴ Landgrebe adds (83/61) that the capability-consciousness proper to holding sway in the body genetically precedes any developed I-consciousness, so that the discovery of what is *mine* precedes the discovery of the *I*.¹⁵

Thus the explanation from the perspective of phenomenological genesis is as follows: the spontaneity of an activity that justifies positing the *I* as a center from which activity can be initiated is originally undisclosed. It nonetheless governs the activity, albeit in a manner undisclosed to itself—a manner that can more precisely be characterized as a “bodily feeling” that we could interpret as an inwardness preceding the developed consciousness of the *I*, an inwardness lived as a (satisfied or unsatisfied) bodily feeling connected with the accomplishments of kinaesthesia.

According to Landgrebe (85/63), the question of subjectivity and the embodiment of the original streaming of experiences that is the origin of appearing beyond reflection must ultimately be thought in keeping with the following remark by Husserl expressing the paradox not only of embodied subjectivity, but of subjectivity as such: “the streaming is always in advance, but the *I* is always also in advance.”¹⁶ This means that the streaming cannot be taken as a diffuse process that might somehow explain the individuation of the *I*; instead, the principle of individuation must already bear this streaming process within itself:

The process is indeed anonymous, and its original performance cannot be brought within the purview of reflection; nevertheless, we may say of it that it cannot produce individuation: rather, it is the case that in order for the process to *exist* at all, an organization is already presupposed that can be experienced in each case as “my body” and “my *I* belonging to it.” (85f./64)

It would then seem that the centering brings a feeling of the body in kinaesthesia into the anonymity of the original stream of experiences, and that in this sense not only is the body the origin of what I experience as *mine*—an experience that precedes the explicit consciousness of the *I*—but the centering itself also takes place through the body, and thereby a certain individuation of the stream of experiences takes place through the lived body as well.

¹⁴ Edmund Husserl, *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologische Philosophie. Zweites Buch: Phänomenologische Untersuchungen zur Konstitution*, ed. Marly Biemel, *Husserliana IV* (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1952), 261 (subsequently cited as Hua IV).

¹⁵ See Hua IV, 258n.

¹⁶ See Hua XXXIV, 181.

However, Landgrebe denies this in the course of his interpretation of the relationship between the I and the body:

Subjectivity is therefore not individuated through the body as Merleau-Ponty thought, since the presupposition for there being a body at all is that someone has it and has already learned to have it at his/her disposal, even before discovering him/herself as an I. The body does not discover itself as an I ...— rather, in each case I discover my body, the body does not disclose itself as an I. (86/64)

In this manner, Landgrebe defends Husserl's concept of the “pure I” as an irreducible moment of subjectivity, albeit with the qualification that for Husserl himself, this is only a matter of an “I” in an equivocal sense; in reality, the “pure I” is a stopgap expression chosen for an “*absolute principle of individuation*” (86/64).¹⁷

Thus for Landgrebe the body is not the origin of subjectivity in the sense of bringing about the individuation or singularity of the stream of experiences. The I is “pure” because “it cannot be understood as corporeal,” as Landgrebe literally says, adding that “the pure I is the presupposition for something like the body to be given” (86/64). If both the streaming and the I are co-original, it then follows for Landgrebe that “*the being of each I is an absolute facticity in the same manner as the primal streaming*” (87/65).¹⁸

Conclusion

What follows from this with regard to the role of the body in the event of appearing? In the article to which the present essay is devoted, then, Landgrebe

¹⁷ Similarly, as Landgrebe says elsewhere in his article, “That there is always a center of spontaneity in each case cannot be further derived from anything else” (83/61). See also Husserl: “We must then also show that activity presupposes affection, and what we eventually come back to is that even the I is subject to ontic constitution, that underlying the I as always already constituted (although anonymous in each case) there is a pure I-pole, that the ontification of the I always already presupposes an I in function—an I that for its part needs affection in order to function, and even to function for I-ontification”—Hua Mat VIII, 187.

¹⁸ As Zahavi notes, there is no “intersubjectivity” that would exist prior to individuation and would then subsequently undergo a “‘centering’; rather, transcendental intersubjectivity ‘contains transcendental subjectivity within itself’ ... as the place of its unfolding”—and as he goes on to say, “Husserl obviously does hold the view that one can speak of the I as the principle of unity of the stream of consciousness without bringing in the effective performance of others. At this very rudimentary level, there is an operatively functioning accomplishing that is in fact solitary, that is not in fact brought about by way of others.” Thus according to Zahavi, the sphere of primordiality is justified in view of the fact that “one cannot conceive of intersubjectivity independently from a (possible) plurality of individuated subjects”—Dan Zahavi, *Husserl and Transcendental Intersubjectivity*, trans. Elizabeth A. Behnke (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2001), 84.

also takes a particular unequivocal stance on this issue within the framework of the discussion of his third thesis: the original stream of transcendental subjectivity's experiences is experienced as an event that

runs, so to speak, through our body and through the body of all the others we share our world with. However, it is differentiated from the very beginning into that which we have at our disposal, within certain limits, as *our* bodily-kinaesthetic event, and that which comes toward us, thereby affecting us; in the immediacy of its coming toward us, it is not at our disposal, and in this sense it is “*extra-corporeal*” [“*ausserleiblich*”]. It nevertheless shows itself to us as something that stands in an inseparable relationship with what anyone can experience as *his/her own body*. (84/62f.)

On the basis of this interpretation of Husserl's genetic phenomenology, we may then say that there is no appearing that is not an appearing for an I; thus for Husserl the event of appearing always has a subjective character in which embodiment participates to a significant extent. Although for Landgrebe embodiment is not the origin of the subjective character of the event of appearing, it is certainly a specific condition for this event, which accordingly allows him to say that transcendental subjectivity has a bodily character. The facticity of embodiment—the fact that before the I becomes conscious, it is preceded by the feeling of the body as mine (for example, in the accomplishments of kinaesthesia)—is not a “primal” fact (*Urfactum*) in the sense of something that could not be further explored.¹⁹ Instead, this character of irreducible facticity pertains to the fact “that there is always a center of spontaneity in each case,” a center that according to Landgrebe “cannot be further derived from anything else” (83/61)—this is why it is a kind of *primal* fact.

¹⁹ An approach that does attempt to explore kinaesthetic activity is developed in works by Elizabeth A. Behnke. Cf., e.g., her “Bodily Protentionality,” *Husserl Studies* 25 (2009): 185–217. She shows there that embodiment is a “*continuously ongoing act*” in the following sense: “Embodiment in the sense meant here must therefore be sharply distinguished from the *Verleiblichung* and *Verweltlichung* [of some disembodied mind] ...; instead, it has to do with the ongoing streaming life of the I”: “Thus any new kinaesthetic enactment arises from a constellation of kinaesthetic possibilities already in play, and this continual actualization of kinaesthetic capability is precisely what the phrase ‘embodiment as an ongoing act’ signifies here” (*ibid.*, 191, 192). Lanei Rodemayer (“Levels of Constitution”) indicates a different direction of analysis: “At the level of passive synthesis (and even in a rudimentary way at the primordial level), different types of sensations are grouped together, based upon their similarity to one another. The sensory experiences of my body stand out as belonging to one another. As they are grouped together through association, my body becomes constituted through passive synthesis as both a subjective cluster of experiences belonging to me, and as an object in relation to other objects of experience. In this way, my body is a continual experience through time—and at every level of constitution.”

Of course, the facticity of embodiment may indeed be investigated further in terms of its role in the functioning of subjectivity in its different aspects; moreover, this has already been a subject of both Husserlian and post-Husserlian phenomenological research for many other authors who have also tried to think the anonymous event of transcendental subjectivity in contexts that are at the limits of the framework of phenomenology, the limits that Husserl himself already approached in his genetic phenomenology. It is precisely in these contexts that the role of embodiment in the constitution of phenomenality can be made concrete and the question of how the subjectivity of the event of appearing is embodied can be posed. The merit of Landgrebe as a teacher whose investigations have paved the way for the development of these lines of research is undeniable.²⁰

²⁰ The translators of the original version of this paper from the Czech are Ivan Gutierrez and David Vichnar. For the revision of the new version of the text, the translation of some quotations from Husserl, and the editing work, I would like to express my gratitude to E. A. Behnke. The presentation of this paper in Louvain-la-Neuve in September 2017 was made possible by the grant research project “Life and Environment: Phenomenological Relations between Subjectivity and the Natural World” (GAP 401 15-10832S), and its publication is supported within the framework of institutional support for the Long-Term Development of Research Organizations provided by the Ministry of Education, Youth, and Sports to the Faculty of Humanities, Charles University (2018).